The object of G. F. Meier's Vernunftlehre and its abridgement for courses, the Auszug aus der Vernunftlehre, does not consist exclusively in the elaboration of the formal aspects of logic, but rather in the individuation of the elements of thought and language, which make human understanding possible. Instead of limiting himself to formal truth, Meier investigates the realms of epistemic, aesthetic, and historic truths, of horizons, and prejudices. Kant used both Meier's Vernunftlehre and its Auszug for about forty years in (...) his logic-lectures. Kant's Logik, and also his Kritik der reinen Vernunft, were thus strongly influenced by Meier. (shrink)

Inhalt: K.-O. Apel: Vorwort - G. Calabro: Gesprach uber Hobbes mit Karl-Heinz Ilting - I. Grundfragen der praktischen Philosophie: H.-G. Gadamer: Die Gegenwart der sokratischen Frage in Aristoteles - P. Lorenzen: Politische Ethik - J. D'Hondt: Die Ethik und der Weltlauf - K.-O. Apel: Faktische Anerkennung oder einsehbar notwendige Anerkennung? - H. Schnadelbach: Rationalitat und Normativitat - F. W. Veauthier: Vom sozialen Verantwortungsapriori im phanomenologischen Denken - K. Lorenz: Der Antagonismus von Freiheit und Gerechtigkeit - P. Rohs: Moralische Praferenzen - (...) H. Hoppe: Normenbegrundung ohne naturalistischen Fehlschluss? - W. Kuhlmann: Solipsismus in Kants praktischer Philosophie und die Diskursethik - R. Maliandi: Anerkennung oder Argumentation? - L. H. Meyer: Anerkennung, Zumutbarkeit und Diskussion als praktische Prinzipien - A. Cortina: Substantielle Ethik oder wertfreie Verfahrensethik? - R. Zimmer: Der Selbstbezug des asthetischen Zeichens - II. Zur Geschichte der praktischen Philosophie: P. R. Franke: Zu einem Munzbildnis des Stoikers Chrysippos - V. Hosle: Recht und Geschichte bei Giambattista Vico - M. Riedel: Imputation der Handlung und Applikation des Sittengesetzes - A. Buha: Moral und Geschichte - C. Cesa: Zum Begriff des Praktischen bei Fichte - N. Bobbio: Hegel und das Recht - L. W. Beck: Reformation, Revolution und Restauration in Hegels politischer Philosophie - D. Losurdo: Moralisches Motiv und Primat der Politik bei Hegel - P. Becchi: Die Wurzeln der Ethik der Uberzeugung - R. Pozzo: 'Bourgeois' oder 'citoyen'? Zu Hegels Begriff der burgerlichen Gesellschaft - Die Veroffentlichungen K.-H. Iltings von P. Becchi - Personenregister - Sachregister. (shrink)

: The object of G. F. Meier's Vernunftlehre and its abridgement for courses, the Auszug aus der Vernunftlehre, does not consist exclusively in the elaboration of the formal aspects of logic, but rather in the individuation of the elements of thought and language, which make human understanding possible. Instead of limiting himself to formal truth, Meier investigates the realms of epistemic, aesthetic, and historic truths, of horizons, and prejudices. Kant used both Meier's Vernunftlehre and its Auszug for about forty years (...) in his logic-lectures. Kant's Logik, and also his Kritik der reinen Vernunft, were thus strongly influenced by Meier. (shrink)

‘Social and Cultural Innovation’ is a syntagma that is receiving increased usage among researchers since it was the title chosen by the European Strategy Forum Research Infrastructures for the working group that deals with research infrastructures primarily connected with Social Sciences and the Humanities. Innovation refers to the creation of new products and services by bringing a new idea to the market. Economic growth turns on infrastructures, which provide access to services and knowledge, e.g. by overcoming the digital divide. The (...) current migrant and refugee crisis has made it clear with extraordinary effectiveness that a most urgent objective is to work out policies of social and cultural innovation to the advantage of new citizens – policies that will make them feel welcome in full dignity. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Zwischen Aufklärungund Vernunftkritık. Studıen zum Kantischen Logıkcorpus by Norbert HinskeRiccardo PozzoNorbert Hinske. Zwischen Aufklärungund Vernunftkritık. Studıen zum Kantischen Logıkcorpus. Bad Cannstatt: Frommann-Holzboog, 1998. Pp. 192. Cloth, DM 156.00.This book is the result of a decade of research that Hinske has undertaken and continues to pursue into Kant’s logical writing in which philological, lexicographic, historical, and genuinely philosophical aspects are connected in an inseparable unity. In fact, it was (...) in order to cope scientifically with the peculiar problems that affect Kant’s logical writings from the point of view of the constitution of the text and of the recognition of the sources due to the mutual explanation and correction of published works, manuscript notes (which appeared in 1914), and lecture transcripts (which appeared first in 1966), that Hinske decided to open the venture of the Kant-Index. Hinske notices that the Kant-Index (seven volumes have appeared so far) had been started with the goal of providing a comprehensive approach to Kant’s logical writing, “whose composite forms [End Page 681] of expression rather hide its wealth of ideas” instead of clarifying it, and at the same time of providing “philological foundations for a responsible new edition of the lecture transcripts, whose scandalous [1966] edition within the fourth section of the Akademie-Ausgabe should have been rewarded with something more than the embarrassed silence of the Kant-Forschung and of both the academies [Berlin and Göttingen] responsible for this disaster” (13f.). The present book accompanies the Kant-Index in the sense that it collects a series of investigations (some of which have already appeared in journals, but have been entirely revised in order to guarantee uniformity to the volume) focusing on the two main issues indicated in its title: Kant’s proximity to the philosophy of German Enlightenment, “that finds expression in Kant’s logical writings in a quite peculiar way,” and the progressive elaboration of the Critique of Pure Reason, “which can be reconstructed at least partially on the basis of the extant lecture transcripts” (14).The development Kant underwent from an enlightened philosopher to the architect of the critique of reason is the subject of the title essay that serves as an introduction to the whole book (17–40). Hinske shows that Kant’s logic lectures are a mirror of the philosophy of the German Enlightenment (20) because Kant was not supposed to teach logic as such, but rather logic as an introduction to philosophy in general. For this reason, one finds in Kant’s logic lectures an original elaboration on the three fundamental issues expressed by the German Enlightenment, namely the programmatic ideas of thinking for oneself, the polemical idea of prejudice, and the basic idea of universal human reason. There was no “overcoming” of the Enlightenment by Kant, just as there was no “double life” of Kant as a teacher in Königsberg and as a scientist within the république des lettres (27); there was rather a genuine connection of teaching and research. In fact, if one considers the relation of the logic lectures to the Critique, it becomes clear that the terminology adopted by G. F. Meier, the author of the Auszug aus der Vernunftlehre, the logic textbook Kant used for over forty years, has a remarkable influence in constituting the terminology of the Critique (28), and that the doctrine of elements and doctrine of method division of the Critique finds its roots in the Enlightenment research on the pair of concepts logica theoretica and logica practica (30). Considering continuities and transformations in Kant’s logical writings (32–40), Hinske shows how Kant step by step puts together a new philosophical language by relying on recent Germanizations of the Enlighteners, especially the ones introduced by Wolff and G. F. Meier (33), as well as on traditional Latin terms (39).The first part of Hinske’s book deals with the heritage of the Enlightenment. It contains papers on Kant’s use of the distinction between learning philosophy and learning to philosophize (42–59), on the prejudice of antiquity (60–73), and on the pair of concepts pluralism-egoism (74... (shrink)

Hegel scholars have been waiting two and a half decades for this book to appear. It contains the historicocritical edition of all unpublished papers written by Hegel from the end of the Frankfort period through to the end of the Bamberg period. Most importantly, it contains the first edition of two sets of until now unpublished manuscripts that had been discovered by Eva Ziesche in the early seventies referring to the lectures given by Hegel at Jena on “Introduction to Philosophy” (...) and “Logic and Metaphysics,” in the 1801/02 Winter Term, and on “Philosophy of Spirit” in the 1803 Summer Term. These fragments are a very important piece in the rather complicated history of Hegel’s development, because they document the state of Hegel’s thought after the nonsystematic essays of the Frankfurt period and before the turn toward subjectivity beginning with the Jenese lectures on the Philosophy of Spirit of the 1803/04 Winter Term. In those years Hegel was working on a metaphysics of substance that he was to give up as soon as he became aware that the foundation of dialectic lies in the subjective structure of the self. The fragments had been last accounted for by Karl Rosenkranz in his Hegel’s Leben, and were misplaced in the manuscript section of the Berlin State Library sometime afterwards. The rediscovery of the fragments was made public by Eva Ziesche in 1975 in the Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung; and some passages of the fragments were reported in a seminal paper by Baum and Meist which appeared in 1977 in the Hegel-Studien under the title “Durch Philosophie leben lernen,” that is, to learn to live through philosophy. Unfortunately, for twenty-two long years the paper by Baum and Meist has remained the only source of information about the content of this crucial stage of Hegelian thought; and this is too bad, because a lot of good research might have been produced had this edition appeared earlier. (shrink)

G. F. Meier was born in Halle in 1718 and died there after an uneventful life in 1777. He may not be well known to the English speaking public, but he is important because he was among the most authoritative figures of the Aufklärung and in particular because his influence on Kant was considerable. In accordance with the understanding of logic that prevailed during the eighteenth century, Meier’s Vernunftlehre and its abridgment for courses, the Auszug aus der Vernunftlehre, both published (...) in 1752, are at the same time and especially an introduction to the whole of philosophy. In fact, their goal is not just the elaboration of the formal aspects of logic, but rather the individuation of the elements of thought and language that make human cognition possible. What is peculiar in Meier’s approach is that instead of limiting himself to formal truth, he includes in his logic all kinds of epistemic truths. Meier deals not only with “dogmatic” and “historical” truths, but also with “merely aesthetic,” “merely philosophical,” and even “aesthetical-philosophical” truths. Moreover, Meier’s logic is not only inclusive of aesthetics, it is at the same time rhetoric. In fact, at the beginning of both books, Meier declares that under Vernunftlehre he understands a science that deals with the rules of philosophical cognition and philosophical speech. Kant adopted Meier’s two logic books for his lectures on logic for forty years. It is not at all surprising, then, that Kant’s own logical writings and even his Critique of Pure Reason were influenced by Meier. So too, one finds in Kant’s Reflections on Logic and Lectures on Logic elaborations of some of the fundamental issues addressed by Meier, such as the analysis of prejudices and the articulation of the conditions for the constitution of a horizon. In this context, Locke’s philosophy plays an especially important role. In fact, Meier served as mediator between Locke and Kant. Meier not only knew Locke well and appealed to his theories in his writings; he also helped to introduce Lockean issues such as the “extent of human knowledge” and the “degrees of assent” to the teaching of logic in the German universities; and, most important, he made such issues salient for the philosophy of Kant. (shrink)

This book investigates the relation between mathematics and philosophy in Kant with special focus on the doctrine of the magnitudes. Without doubt, Moretto, who is himself both a mathematician and a philosopher, achieves final results on this matter, because not only does he provide an immanent interpretation of all parts of Kant’s systematic construction of magnitudes, he also provides a detailed history of Kant’s development. Kant gave courses on mathematics during the first eight years of his teaching at Königsberg and (...) warmly recommended the study of mathematics to his most gifted disciples. He himself expressed a profound admiration for it. He wrote in The Only Possible Argument in Support of a Demonstration of the Existence of God that infinitesimal analysis, or, as he calls it, “higher geometry... in its account of the affinities between various species of curved lines,” reveals many of “the harmonious relations which inhere in the properties of space in general.... All these relations, in addition to exercising the understanding by means of our intellectual comprehension of them, also arouse the emotions, and they do in a manner similar to or even more sublime than that the contingent beauties of nature stir our feelings”. In On the Form and Principles of the Sensible and Intelligible World, Kant wrote that pure mathematics “provides us with a cognition which is in the highest degree true, and, at the same time, it provides us with a paradigm of the highest kind of evidence in other cases”. Besides, the mathematician-philosophers of the Leibniz-Wolff school, J. A. Eberhard, J. C. Schwab, J. G. E. Maaß at Halle, and A. G. Kästner at Göttingen, were among the very first to move critiques against the Critique of Pure Reason by focusing on the problem of the foundation of mathematics. They defended Leibniz against Kant, which prompted Kant to start a mathematical school of his own at Königsberg, and J. Schultz, J. G. K. C. Kiesewetter, and C. G. Zimmermann were Kant’s most notable defenders. Finally, one should not forget that it was in order to introduce a completely new set of ideas concerning the philosophy of mathematics that Kant laid out not only the distinction between analytical and synthetical judgments, but also the whole of the transcendental aesthetics. In fact, Kant proposed giving foundation to rational absolute numbers by means of synthetical a priori judgments; he also considered all arithmetical judgments as synthetical a priori; and by dedicating two antinomies to infinite series he suggested analogies to the representation of infinite series of irrational numbers. (shrink)

Pollok’s lengthy and extremely careful commentary of Kant’s Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Naturwissenschaft is a dissertation defended at Marburg in 2000. It accompanies the Studienausgabe of Kant’s text that Pollok has provided as volume 508 of the Philosophische Bibliothek. The commentary embraces a threefold perspective. First, it accounts for the rationality of the author, that is, it accounts for the consistency and coherence of the work itself. However, Pollok is ready to go beyond the MAdN and consider other Kantian writings, whenever (...) this helps the understanding of the former. Three documents that are most interesting in this regard, namely, the Physik-Nachschrift Herder, the Berliner Physik-Nachschrift, and the Danziger Physik-Nachschrift are either actual lecture notes, or transcriptions of lecture notes, or copies of transcriptions of lecture notes. They require a careful critical assessment, especially when they point out discrepancies within the MAdN. In fact, says Pollok, the level of mathematical sophistication of these lecture notes is of such simplicity, that they could by no means be considered as representative of late eighteenth-century physics “in its proper form.” Second, the commentary accounts for all of Kant’s sources, from the textbooks he adopted for his courses to the works he read for his own research. Without doubt, says Pollok, Kant belongs to the group of those mathematical lay-people who were hardly able to master the details of, say, Newton’s determination of elliptic, parabolic, and hyperbolic orbits, Leibniz’s integration of mathematical formulas, or Euler’s mathematico-mechanical analysis of the movement of solid or fluid bodies. The basis of Kant’s reflections were rather the expositions of the corresponding results in natural sciences textbooks of his time, such as those by J. P. Eberhard, J. H. C. Erxleben, G. E. Hamberger, W. J. G. Karsten, A. G. Kästner, J. Keill, J. G. Krüger, J. H. Lambert, P. van Muschenbroek, J. J. Scheuchzer, J. A. von Segner, or C. Wolff. In sum, Kant was neither a Newtonian, nor a Leibnizian, nor an Eulerian: he rather found a stance of his own on the basis of his systematic interests. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Kant-Index: Band 5: Stellenindex und Konkordanz zur "Wiener Logik,"Riccardo PozzoNorbert Hinske. Kant-Index: Band 5: Stellenindex und Konkordanz zur "Wiener Logik," Erstellt in Zusammenarbeit mit Heinrich P. Delfosse und Michael Oberhausen unter Mitwirkung von Hans-Werner Bartz, Christian Popp, Tina Strauch und Michael Trauth. Bad Cannstatt: frommann-holzboog, 1999. Pp. Cxiii + 865.The Wiener Logik has long led a shadowy existence. This has nothing to do with the quality of the (...) text, but rather with accidental conditions. When the manuscript of the Wiener Logik was discovered in 1913, the planning of the Akademie-Ausgabe of Kant's complete works had already been largely completed and eight volumes of the works, three of the correspondence and two of the Nachlaß were published. Erich Adickes' edition of Kant's Reflexionen über die Logik appeared in 1914. Hinske suggests that, had Adickes considered it, the Wiener Logik would have played a valuable role in integrating Kant's reflections (xi). This double-volume makes up for all this by highlighting the relevance of this lecture transcript with special reference to Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, which is close to it not only in time but also systematically. It contains a lemmatized main index that makes a recognition of the language of the logic course possible and a concordance that allows one to check the corresponding passages. The introduction and more than twenty pages of editorial notes elaborate on the relationship of the Wiener Logik to other Kantian texts while correcting and integrating the references to sources indicated in its 1966 edition by Gerhard Lehmann within the Akademie-Ausgabe (lxxii-xcvi). At the same time, the index correcs more than one hundred fifty errors of the 1966 edition (lviii-lxvii).The Wiener Logik was translated into English by J. Michael Young in the volume of The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant dedicated to the Lectures on Logic (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992, 251-377). Young made clear that the Wiener Logik is constituted by two different parts (ibid., xxv f.). In fact the manuscript shows a first part written by the hand of a professional copyist, which covers Kant's course until almost the end of the theory of judgement (Akademie-Ausgabe, vol. 24, 790-937), and a second part constituted by a single page written by another hand (probably a student while sitting in Kant's classroom), which deals with the very end of the theory of judgement and the beginning of the theory of syllogism (ibid., 937-40). One needs to recall, though, that the text of the Wiener Logik is incomplete, given that a large part of the theory of syllogism as well as the theory of method, of discourse and of character are missing. The first part of the Wiener Logik shows several parallels with the edited fragments of the Logik Hoffmann (ibid., 944-52), while the second part shows parallels with the Logik Hechsel, which was discovered in 1983 and has recently been made accessible by Tilman Pinder (cf. Logik-Vorlesungen: Unveröffentliche Nachschriften, Hamburg: Meiner, 1998, 271-499). In fact, J. Michael Young found it convenient to complete his translation of the missing parts of the Wiener Logik by the attaching to it the corresponding parts of the Logik Hechsel (cf. Lectures on Logic, 381-423).Hinske provides new arguments as regards the dating of the Wiener Logik by objecting to both the late dating to the nineties suggested by Wilhelm Jerusalem and the early dating before 1781 by Reinhard Brandt and Tilman Pinder. Hinske remarks that while for the terminus ad quem one should consider the years indicated on the frontispice (1794 [End Page 284] and 1796), the terminus a quo should be set after the final redaction of the Critique of Pure Reason (xxiii f.). Following Hinske's lead and on the basis of an accurate examination on the cross-references between the texts, Bruno Bianco has proposed that the terminus a quo be set not before the publication of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason (cf. the Italian translation edited by Bianco, Milan: Angeli, forthcoming).What makes the Wiener Logik and this index particularly interesting for Kant... (shrink)

Older and newer forms of vulnerability are manifesting themselves today, denouncing a suffering which is both material and existential, individual and societal. It is particularly evident within urban contexts and amplified by the crumbling of collective belonging and the increasing scarcity of places of participation where responsibility and the commitment to building one’s own personal biography are increasingly delegated to each individual, both materially and symbolically. Two separate pedagogical studies will explore some processes of signification of the experiences connected to (...) new poverty, emphasizing the risks of simplification and normativity identified in some of the current interpretations in the common sense, such as the problematic proximity which these are in danger of sharing with the interpretative premises that shape the same local educational services dedicated to new poverty itself. (shrink)

In this article, I examine Peter Morgan's TV series The Crown (2016–present) through the lens of Sartrean and Beauvoirian existentialism. I argue that the character of Queen Elizabeth II holds a special place in the royal family, as the monarch who demonstrates the compatibility of duty and tradition with existential freedom and authenticity. I also demonstrate the series’ commitment to breaking the illusion of inhumanity that the royal family tries to maintain, by showing that the royals are not out-of-reach ideals, (...) but humans who struggle to transcend their exceptionally binding facticity. As portrayed in The Crown, Queen Elizabeth's lucidity on her situation leads to honest introspection, which dispels any attempt at self-deception, and therefore prevents her from slipping into bad faith. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Philosophy 41.3 (2003) 414-415 [Access article in PDF] Gregorio Piaia, editor. La presenza dell'aristotelismo padovano nella filosofia della prima modernità: Atti del Colloquio internazionale in memoria di Charles B. Schmitt (Padova, 4-6 settembre 2000). Rome and Padua: Antenore, 2002. Pp. 488. Paper, € 38.00.Dedicated to the impact of Paduan Aristotelianism on early modern philosophy, this volume, edited by Gregorio Piaia, presents the proceedings of (...) a much-anticipated conference held in memory of Charles B. Schmitt at the University of Padua on September 4-6, 2000, jointly co-sponsored by Padua's Department of Philosophy, the Centro per la Storia dell'Università di Padova, the Seminar für Philosophie und Geistesgeschichte der Renaissance of the University of Munich, the Center for Medieval and Renaissance Natural Philosophy of the Catholic University of Nijmegen, and the Foundation for Intellectual History of London. It was indeed Schmitt's merit (one thinks first and foremost of The Cambridge History of Renaissance Philosophy he edited in 1988) to have revised in the most critical and convincing way the image historians of philosophy had of Renaissance Aristotelianism as a backward-looking movement unable to express any vitality, to say nothing about its influence on later philosophers. Obviously, the Paduan Aristotelians did not achieve the same impact as Descartes and they did not produce the sharp reactions the libertins provoked. Yet, their impact was substantial, as many contributors show, with a concentration in the north of central Europe, i.e., in Germany and in Scandinavia.The volume opens with a paper by Stefano Perfetti on the physician, statesman, and philosopher Giulio Cesare Scaligero, who belongs among the Paduan Aristotelians because he received his education at Padua. The works of the "pure Aristotelian" (following the definition of this movement provided by Wilhelm Risse) Giacomo Zabarella, surely the most celebrated of the group, is the subject of papers by Francesco Bottin, Ian McLean, Sachicko Kusukawa, Daniel A. Di Liscia, Heikki Mikkeli, Merio Scattola, David A. Lines, Antonino Poppi, Paul Richard Blum, Giovanna Varani, Gregorio Piaia, and Giuseppe Micheli. They have looked into the impact of Zabarella's philosophy, logic, and theory of demonstration (the celebrated regressus) in contexts such as Lutheran Germany and Scandinavia, Reformed Germany and Holland, and Catholic Italy and France during the impressive span from the publication of Melanchthon's Dialectic in 1520 to that of Kant's Critique of Judgment in 1790. Less known today, but quite influential until 1648, was the "eclectic Aristotelian" (to use Schmitt's phrase) and colleague (and antagonist) of Zabarella, Francesco Piccolomini, whom Jill Kraye, Heikki Mikkeli, Merio Scattola, and David A. Lines consider in their papers. Piccolomini became famous for his mediation between Aristotelianism and Platonism. He revived "the soul of Aristotle and the spirit of Plato," as a contemporary said. Pierre Bayle and Jakob Brucker highlighted Piccolomini's efforts to combine Aristotelian and Platonic philosophy; and modern scholars have identified many [End Page 414] Platonizing elements in his Aristotelianism. In the hope of producing a more accurate and complete picture of eclectic Aristotelianism within the context of Renaissance moral philosophy, Jill Kraye's paper explores a neglected side of Piccolomini's ethical thought, namely his careful account of Stoicism. Finally, a group of papers with a more general scope needs to be mentioned, namely Heinrich C. Kuhn's survey of works of Paduan Aristotelians in German libraries, Charles H. Lohr's paper on the sources of Calvinist theories of science, and Ekhard Kessler's paper on the relation of logic to hermeneutics. As a last remark, of the seventeen contributions to this important volume, which no research library should be without, eight are in Italian, six in English, and three in German. Riccardo Pozzo Università di Verona... (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Kant-Studien Jahrgang: 109 Heft: 1 Seiten: 185-188.

Information can be public among a group. Whether or not information is public matters, for example, for accounts of interdependent rational choice, of communication, and of joint intention. A standard analysis of public information identifies it with (some variant of) common belief. The latter notion is stipulatively defined as an infinite conjunction: for p to be commonly believed is for it to believed by all members of a group, for all members to believe that all members believe it, and so (...) forth. This analysis is often presupposed without much argument in philosophy. Theoretical entrenchment or intuitions about cases might give some traction on the question, but give little insight about why the identification holds, if it does. The strategy of this paper is to characterize a practical-normative role for information being public, and show that the only things that play that role are (variants of) common belief as stipulatively characterized. In more detail: a functional role for “taking a proposition for granted” in non-isolated decision making is characterized. I then present some minimal conditions under which such an attitude is correctly held. The key assumption links this attitude to beliefs about what is public. From minimal a priori principles, we can argue that a proposition being public among a group entails common commitment to believe among that group. Later sections explore partial converses to this result, the factivity of publicity and publicity from the perspective of outsiders to the group, and objections to the aprioricity of the result deriving from a posteriori existential presuppositions. (shrink)

Bazzocchi disposes the text of the Tractatus in a user-friendly manner, exactly as Wittgenstein's decimals advise. This discloses the logical form of the book by distinct reading units, linked into a fashioned hierarchical tree. The text becomes much clearer and every reader can enjoy, finally, its formal and literary qualities.

1. Sae sidae rŭl yŏrŏ gan saramdŭl -- 2. Ŏdum ŭi sidae.